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Liu v. Christopher Homes, LLC, 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 17 (Mar. 27, 2014)1
CIVIL PROCEDURE: ATTORNEY FEES AS SPECIAL DAMAGES
Summary
The Court clarified two issues: (1) Sandy Valley Associates v. Sky Ranch Estates Owners
Association’s2 and Horgan v. Felton’s3 effect on the law regarding the recovery of attorney fees
as special damages; and (2) the extent to which Horgan retreated from Sandy Valley’s discussion
about the grounds for recovering attorney fees as special damages.
Disposition
The decision in Horgan v. Felton4 should not be read to mean that a party in any matter
that relates to real property must prevail on a slander of title claim in order to recover attorney
fees as special damages. Rather, Horgan only applies in a special type of civil action that is
brought by a party: an action to clarify or remove a cloud on title.5
Factual and Procedural History
The Plaintiff purchased a home from developer Christopher Homes Ridges, LLC
(“CHR”) pursuant to a contract (“the Agreement”) wherein CHR agreed to covey good
marketable title to the Plaintiff at the close of escrow.
CHR hired Christopher Homes, LLC (“CH”) as a general contractor who subsequently
hired K&D Construction (K&D) as a subcontractor for various services. CHR failed to timely or
fully pay K&D and as a result K&D recorded a lien on various properties, one of which was the
Plaintiff’s.
K&D filed a civil suit against CHR, CH and the Plaintiff to recover on the liens through
foreclosure. In answer, the Plaintiff filed a cross-claim against CHR for a breach of contract
claim. Under this claim, the Plaintiff tried to recover attorney fees and costs that she allegedly
incurred in defending herself against K&D’s action.
The district court relied on Horgan and found that, as a matter of law, the Plaintiff could
not recover attorney fees as special damages because she did not prove slander of title. As a
result, the Plaintiff filed an appeal challenging the district court’s determinations regarding the
recovery of attorney fees as special damages.
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Discussion
The Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in its reading of Horgan in favor of CHR
arguing that it does not bar a party from recovering attorney fees as special damages when the
civil action incidentally pertains to title to real property. Instead, the Plaintiff asserted Horgan
only prohibits a grant of attorney fees that stem from an action in which a claimant tries to
remove a cloud on title but fails to prove slander of title. Next, the plaintiff asserted the
attorney’s fees as special damages sought did not arise from an action to remove a cloud on title
but rather from CHR's breach of contract. Liu then argues that Sandy Valley permits the recovery
of attorney fees as special damages that arise from a breach of contract and thus her attorney fees
claim was not barred as a matter of law. The Court reviewed the legal issued presented by these
arguments de novo.6
Horgan's partial abrogation of Sandy Valley
The Court first pointed out that attorney fees are generally not recoverable “absent
authority under a statute, rule, or contract.”7 However, “as an exception to the general rule,”
attorney fees may be awarded “as special damages in limited circumstances.”8
Next the court summarized the three significant statements that are found in Sandy Valley
which concern the grounds for recovering attorney fees as special damages.9 First, attorney fees
may be recovered as special damages if they are pleaded according to NRCP 9(g) and are a
“natural and proximate consequence of the injurious conduct.”10 Second, the court stated that
attorney fees are recoverable as special damages when they arise from a third-party legal dispute
as a result of a breach of contract. 11 Third, the Sandy Valley court stated that in actions
concerning a cloud on title to real property “[a]ttorney fees may . . . be awarded as damages in
those cases in which a party incurred the fees . . . in clarifying or removing a cloud upon the title
to property.”12
Next, the Court went on to discuss how the Horgan court revisited Sandy Valley and
retreated from the third statement above that concerns an award of attorney fees in cloud-on-title
actions.13 There, the court stated “in cases concerning title to real property, attorney fees are
only allowable as special damages in slander of title actions, not merely when a cloud on the title
to real property exists.”14 The Court did not read this statement to the exclusion of the rest of the
opinion.15 Rather, the Court analyzed the remainder of the Horgan opinion, and found that it is
clear the case did not hold that a party in any matter that relates to title to real property must
prevail on a slander of title claim in order to recover attorney fees as special damages. 16 Rather,
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that the Horgan court specifically referred to actions meant only to clarify or remove a cloud-ontitle.17
In such circumstances, the Court concluded that a “plaintiff may recover as damages the
expense of legal proceedings necessary to remove a cloud on the plaintiff’s title” when he or she
prevails on a slander of title claim.18 The Horgan court came to this conclusion by primarily
relying upon authorities that permit the award of attorney fees as special damages to parties who
brought claims to clarify or remove a cloud on title, accrued attorney fees in bringing those
claims, and prevailed on a slander of title claim.19 Thus, the Horgan court’s holding applies to
actions where a plaintiff seeks recovery of attorney fees that were accrued from pursuing an
action to clarify or remove a cloud-on-title. Moreover, the Horgan court was not concluding that
a slander of title claim is a prerequisite to recovering attorney fees as special damages in all civil
actions that relate to title to real property.20 Rather, it is only a prerequisite to a party’s recovery
of attorney fees that were sustained in asserting claims to clarify or remove a cloud-on-title, such
as declaratory or equitable relief claims.21
In the present case, the Court pointed out that the Plaintiff incurred attorney fees by
defending against K&D’s civil action that was a result of CHR’s breach of the Agreement not
from a claim seeking declaratory or equitable relief. Therefore, the Court agreed with the
Plaintiff’s argument in that the attorney fees claim asserted by the Plaintiff was not in the
purview of Horgan’s requirement that a party who brought an action to clarify or remove a
cloud-on-title must prove slander of title in order to recover the attorney fees that he or she
incurred in the action.22
The portion of Sandy Valley that Horgan did not overturn
Finally, in light of the above discussion, the Court held that it maintained that “a party to
a contract may recover from a breaching party the attorney fees that arise from the breach that
caused the former party to accrue attorney fees in defending himself or herself against a third
party’s legal action.” Specifically, the Court found that the Horgan decision did not retreat from
Sandy Valley’s conclusion on the first and second statements referenced above.
Conclusion
In the present case, the Court held that Sandy Valley permits, and Horgan does not bar,
Liu’s claim to recover attorney fees as special damages that were purportedly sustained in
defending herself against K&D’s suit, which was allegedly caused by CHR’s breach of the
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Agreement. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court’s findings of fact, conclusions of
law and judgment on Liu’s claim and remanded the matter for further proceedings.23
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The Court also instructed the district court to make a determination on whether the evidence before it proved that
CHR’s breach of the Agreement caused Liu to accumulate the attorney fees in defending her interest against K&D’s
suit. This was a question of fact that was inappropriate to determine for the first time on appeal.

